Missouri Law Review
Volume 53
Issue 2 Spring 1988

Article 7

Spring 1988

New Subject Matter Jurisdiction for the Military Justice System, A
Dean L. Cooper

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Dean L. Cooper, New Subject Matter Jurisdiction for the Military Justice System, A, 53 MO. L. REV. (1988)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Cooper: Cooper: New Subject Matter

A NEW SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION FOR THE MILITARY
JUSTICE SYSTEM
Solorio v. United States

The United States Supreme Court in Solorio v. United States" delivered
a severe blow to the constitutional rights of Armed Forces members. The
Court stated that the court-martial jurisdiction of the United States Armed
Forces is to be based upon the "military status" of the accused.' In so doing,
the Court overruled their 1969 decision which held that the "service-connection" of the offense was the determinate factor in jurisdiction.3 The result of
this ruling is that members of the armed forces will not benefit of the right to
trial by jury,4 the right to a trial by civilian jury5 and the requirement of a
grand jury indictment 6 even where they are the object of prosecution for offenses unconnected to their military duty.
In writing the opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist followed the recent Supreme Court trend of deferring to Congress in cases involving military matters. The Court believes "Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate
task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the military. '
This trend is evidenced in cases where servicemen have gone to court to challenge their lack of constitutional rights.8 Today's answer to the constitutional
problems of the serviceman seems to lie not in judicial review, but rather in
legislative action.
Richard Solorio was charged with sexually abusing two daughters of a
fellow guardman while on duty with the United States Coast Guard in Juneau, Alaska. 9 The offenses were allegedly committed in Solorio's privately
1. 107 S.Ct. 2924 (1987).
2. Id.
3. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
4. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.

7. Solorio, 107 S.Ct. at 2931.
8. E.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986) (free exercise of
religion); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300-05 (1983) (racial discrimination);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1981) (sex discrimination); Brown v. Glines,
444 U.S. 348, 357-60 (1980) (free expression). See also Kaczynski, From O'Callahan
to Chappell: The Burger Court and the Military, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 235, 295-99
(1984); Sherman, Legal Inadequaciesand DoctrinalRestraints in Controlling the Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539, 564-67 (1974).
9. Solorio, 107 S.Ct. at 2925.
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owned home located in the civilian community. 10 The incident was discovered
after Solorio's transfer to New York, where a general court-martial was convened to try him for the alleged crimes in Alaska."1
The military judge hearing the case granted Solorio's motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, applying the "service-connection" test
of O'Callahanv. Parker.2 On appeal,'1 the United States Coast Guard Court
of Military Review reversed, stating that the offenses "were violations against
persons associated with one particular Coast Guard command"' 4 and were
thus service-connected as a matter of law.15 The United
States Court of Mili16
tary Appeals affirmed the Court of Military Review.
The United States Supreme Court received the case on writ of certiorari.' 7 In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court stated
"that the requirements of the Constitution are not violated where, as here, a
court-martial is convened to try a serviceman who was a member of the armed
services at the time of the offense charged."' 8 This means that every statutory
offense" listed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice20 (hereinafter
U.C.M.J.) may be prosecuted by court-martial against an armed services
member regardless of whether the alleged offense was committed while on
duty, on pass, on leave or on any other category of separation from his military duties. Further, the U.C.M.J. and the Supreme
Court specify which per2
sons qualify as "members" of the armed forces. '
10. The court martial was convened to try Solorio on charges resulting from incidents in both Alaska and New York. The New York offenses were not in issue, however, because they occurred in government quarters, thus, meeting the "service connection" test. Id.
11. Id.
12. United States v. Solorio, 21 M.J. 512, 513 (C.G.C.M.R. 1985), affd, 21
M.J. 251 (C.M.A. 1986), affd, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987).
13. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 62, 10 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1) (1982)

[hereinafter U.C.M.J.], authorizes certain appeals by the government from an assortment of rulings and orders made by military judges.
14. Solorio, 21 M.J. at 520.
15. Id.
16. United States v. Solorio, 21 M.J. 251, 258 (C.M.A. 1986).
17. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2926.
18. Id. at 2933. Cf. W. AYCOCK & S. WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 62 (1955). "National Guard personnel, who

have no other dual military status, are not in the armed forces of the United States
except when called into the active federal service by direction of the President either as
units or as individuals." Id. See also O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272 n.18

(1969).
19. The jurisdiction extends to all offenses expressly denounced by Congress in
the punitive articles of the U.C.M.J. U.C.M.J. art. 77-134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934
(1982).
20. The U.C.M.J. was first enacted on May 5, 1950 and for the first time
brought regulation of the several branches of the armed forces under one code. See F.
WEINER, THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 1 (1950).
21. U.C.M.J. art. 2, 10 U.S.C. § 802 (Supp. 1988), states:
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/7
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This jurisdictional issue is of great constitutional significance to the accused. While being prosecuted in a court-martial, the accused "loses" many
constitutional rights.2 2 Pursuant to its article I power to "make rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces," Congress created
the U.C.M.J. to regulate military courts. 23 Because courts-martial receive
their authority under this article I provision they are not part of the judiciary
(a) The following persons are subject to this chapter:
(1) Members of a regular component of the armed forces, including those
awaiting discharge after expiration of their terms of enlistment; volunteers
from the time of their muster or acceptance into the armed forces; inductees
from the time of their actual induction into the armed forces; and other persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed
forces, from the dates when they are required by the terms of the call or order
to obey it.
(2) Cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen.
(3) Members of a reserve component while they are on inactive duty training
authorized by written orders which are voluntarily accepted by them and
which specify that they are subject to this chapter.
(4) Retired members of a regular component of the armed forces who are
entitled to pay.
(5) Retired members of a reserve component who are receiving hospitalization
from an armed fdrce.
(6) Members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corp Reserve.
(7) Persons in custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed by a
court-martial.
(8) Members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Public Health Service, and other organizations, when assigned to and serving with
the armed forces.
(9) Prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces.
(10) In time of war, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in
the field.
(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may
be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with,
employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States
and outside the following: the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
(12) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may
be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons within an area
leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States
which is under the control of the secretary concerned and which is outside the
United States and outside the following, the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands.
See also Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (code does
not apply to civilian dependents accompanying members during peacetime); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (code does not apply to dependent of serviceman accompanying him abroad); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (code
does not apply to discharged servicemen); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866) (code does not apply to civilians).
22. See generally, Willis, The Constitution, the United States Court of Military
Appeals and the Future, 57 MIL. L. REv. 27, 27 n.2 (1972) (material contrasting individual rights in civilian and military criminal proceedings).
23. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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As a result, the fifth

amendment right to indictment by grand jury,2 5 the sixth amendment right to
an impartial jury26 and the right to trial by jury found
in article III section 2,
28
clause 3,27 do not apply to military courts-martial.
The loss of the right to trial by jury, and especially the constitutional
selection process for members thereof, is a notable omission. 29 Only the convening authority may select court-martial members and the selection criteria
are very broad. 0 Consequently, "hand picked" panels are common.31 Even the
Military Court of Appeals recognized the danger that court-martial members
will be selected to aid the prosecution.32 Congress, in the Military Justice Act
of 1983, 33 created a partial remedy by granting the Supreme Court direct review of military appeals on a discretionary basis.34
24. Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 362-63 (1966).
25. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger.. .

."

Id.

26. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed ....

"

Id.

27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury.. .

."

Id.

28. "None of the travesties of justice perpetrated under the U.C.M.J. is really
very surprising, for military law has always been and continues to be primarily an
instrument of discipline, not justice." Glasser, Justice and Captain Levy, 12 COLUM. F.
46, 49 (1969).
29. See generally Goodrich, Denying Soldiers the Rights They Fight to Protect,
2 CAL LAW. 48 (Nov 1982) (result when military law conflicts with constitutional
rights). See also O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 n.7 (1969) (shocking accounts of military injustice).

30. U.C.M.J. art. 25(d)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1982): "When convening a court-

martial, the convening authority shall detail as members thereof such members of the
armed forces as, in his opinion, are best qualified for duty by reason of age, education,
training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament."
31. See United States v. Hedges, 11 C.M.A. 642, 29 C.M.R. 458 (1960) (conviction overturned because court-martial composition gave the appearance of having
been "hand-picked" by the government); United States v. Greene, 20 C.M.A. 232, 43
C.M.R. 72 (1970) (court composed primarily of high ranking officers raising doubts as
to the fairness of the selection process); United States v. Daigle, I M.J. 139 (C.M.A.
1975) (integrity of the military justice system harmed where persons excluded from
serving on a court-martial because of rank). See generally Bogert, Court-Martial:Criticisms and Proposed Reforms, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 18, 21 (1919) (quoting Gen. Ansell,
"the charges [in military courts-martial] may be and frequently are, the result of caprice and petty tyranny.").
32. Morgan, "Best Qualified" or Not? Challenging the Selection of Court-Martial Members, 1987 ARMY LAWYER 34.
33. Military Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393, 1405-06 (codified in
23 U.S.C. § 1259 (Supp. 1 1983)).
34. See generally Boskey & Gressman, The Supreme Court's New Certiorari
Jurisdictionover Military Appeals, 102 F.R.D. 329 (1984).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/7
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Dispute over the proper jurisdiction of armed forces courts-martial focuses on the interpretation of the article I grant of power to Congress "to
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces"3 5 and the fifth amendment exception for "cases arising in the land or
naval forces." 38 From 1866 to 1960, the Supreme Court interpreted the article
I grant to mean that the violation of any statutory offense could be prosecuted
by court-martial without regard to the nature of the offense 37 The military
status of the offender was enough to invoke court-martial jurisdiction. 8 The
Court based its decision on the plain meaning of article I, section 8, clause 14
39
and the exception in the fifth amendment.
This practice was changed by O'Callahanv. Parker,0 in which the Court
determined that an offense committed by a serviceman while off base, out of
uniform, and off duty was not sufficiently "service-connected" to invoke courtmartial jurisdiction.," Uncertainty developed over the meaning and application
of the "service-connected" test. This lead to the Court's effort to clarify the
test in Relford v. Commandant."2 The revised test considered twelve factors in
making a determination of the service-connection of the offense. 3
The Supreme Court in Solorio based their return to the military status
test upon what it saw as a misinterpretation of the historical roots of court
martial jurisdiction by Justice Douglas in O'Callahan and upon the military
35. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
36. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
37. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2926.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2927.
40. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
41. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 274. O'Callahanwas found to be a "newly recognized constitutional principle" and after application of the Stovall test for divining
retrospective effect, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), O'Callahanwas found to
be worthy of prospective effect only. Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 675 (1973). See
also Blumenfeld, Retroactivity After O'Callahan:An Analytical and Statistical Approach, 60 GEo. L.J. 551 (1972) (discussion of possible results of retroactive application); Kaczynski, supra note 8, at 246-50.
42. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
43. Id. at 365. These twelve factors were:
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base; 2. The crime's commission
away from the base; 3. Its commission at a place not under military control;
4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied zone of a
foreign country; 5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to
authority stemming from the war power; 6. The absence of any connection
between the defendant's military duties and the crime; 7. The victim's not
being engaged in the performance of any duty relating to the military; 8. The
presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can be prosecuted; 9. The absence of any flouting of military authority; 10. The absence of
any threat to a military post; 11. The absence of any violation of military
property; 12. The offense's being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts.
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courts' inability to administer the "service-connected" test.4 The Court began
with the premise that the plain meaning of article I, section 8, clause 14 does
not indicate that its grant of power "was any les plenary than the grants of
other authority to Congress in the same section."' 5 No language in the debates
over the adoption of the Constitution differs with the Court. 4 6 In attacking the
O'Callahan opinion, the Court examined the common 7roots of America's
court-martial system and the traditional English system.4
The Court agreed only with the O'Callahan characterization of the conflict over control of military court-martial jurisdiction in 17th century England.4 The Court doubted the O'Callahan statement that citizens in preAmerican England and in our own country had been suspicious of military
trial of soldiers. 49 To back this assertion the Court sought to show that authority existed to court-martial soldiers for civilian offenses during this period.50
The means of doing so was the citation of Section 14, article 16 of the Articles
of War of 177451, which provided for court-martial of any soldier destroying
44. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2928-29.
45. Id. at 2928.
46. Id. 2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787,
329-30 (1911); 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 443-545 (1876).
However, compare the viewpoint of Brigadier General Ansell, acting Judge Advocate
General from 1917 to 1919, questioning the adoption of a system based upon that of an
overthrown government:
I contend - and I have gratifying evidence of support not only from the public
generally but from the profession - that the existing system of Military Justice is un-American, having come to us by inheritance and rather witless
adoption out of a system of government which we regard as fundamentally
intolerable; that it is archaic, belonging as it does to an age when armies were
but bodies of armed retainers and bands of mercenaries; that it is a system
arising out of and regulated by the mere power of Military Command rather
than Law; and that it has ever resulted, as it must ever result, in such injustice as to crush the spirit of the individual subjected to it, shock the public
conscience and alienate public esteem and affection from that which insists
upon maintaining it."
Ansell, Military Justice, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1919).
47. They sought to show that "the history of court-martial jurisdiction in England and [the United States] during the 17th and 18th centuries is far too ambiguous
to justify restriction on the plain language of clause 14." Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2930.
48. This conflict was settled by an acceptance of the Bill of Rights by William
and Mary in 1689. The Parliament, which received the power from the executive
branch in this compromise, used its power sparingly to enact a statute in 1689 that
allowed for court-martial only in the case of sedition, mutiny or desertion. Solorio, 107
S. Ct. at 2928; O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 268; Mutiny Act of 1689, 1 Wm. & Mary, ch.
5; see Schlueter, The Court-Martial:An HistoricalSurvey, 87 MIL. L. REV. 129, 14244 (1986).
49. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 268.
50. Id. at 269. The court had recited from the British Articles of War of 1765, §
11, art. 1, reprinted in 2 W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 1448, 1456
(2d ed. reprint 1920), which established a military offense for any officer failing to
produce a soldier for civilian trial.
51. There is disagreement among historians about which British Articles of War
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/7
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property of one of Britain's subjects.52 The existence of this article was enough
to cast doubt on the O'Callahan" theory.
The Court then examined court-martial jurisdiction in early America beginning with the American Articles of War of 1776. These articles contained a
provision similar to one of the British Articles that required officers to deliver
to the civilian authorities any soldier accused- of crimes against the persons or
property of the United States.5 Drawing an inference from this article that
soldiers were not court-martialed for civilian offenses is hampered by specific
evidence of courts-martial to the contrary55 and confusion over the "general
article" allowing court-martial jurisdiction over all crimes.5 6 The Court decided that this was not sufficient backing to undo over one-hundred years of
court-martial jurisdiction founded upon the military status test.51
The perceived inability of the courts, both civilian and military, to apply
consistently the "service-connected" factors was the second basis for overturning O'Callahan. The Court was uncomfortable with the many subtle distinctions which had developed out of the jurisdictional factors.5 8 The confusion
reached a high with the military's treatment of drug offenses.5 9 The Court
were in effect. The substantive content is the same, however, for present purposes.
Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2929 n.6.
52. Under article 16 it was established that some offenses were prosecutable
under both military and civilian law. Nelson & Westbrook, Court MartialJurisdiction
Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54
MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1969). This fact had not been ignored by O'Callahan.In a footnote the O'Callahan court stated that any crime punishable under civil law could be
brought under court-martial unless the authorities demanded the accused be turned
over within eight days of the offense. O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 269 n.11.
53. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
54. American Articles of War of 1776, § X, art. I, reprintedin 2 W. WINTHROP,
supra note 50, at 1494 (2d ed. reprint 1920).
55. Evidence shows court-martials were held in the late 18th century for crimes
which normally would be punishable as civilian offenses. O'Callahan,295 U.S. at 278
n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army:
Another Problem of Court-MartialJurisdiction,13 VAND. L. REV. 435 (1960).
56. Much confusion arises over the "general article" which allowed court-martial
jurisdiction over "all crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which officers
and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline",
American Articles of War of 1776, § XVIII, art. 5, reprinted in 2 W. WINTHROP,
supra note 50, at 1503, and whether it limited court-martial jurisdiction to those
crimes having an affect on military discipline. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2929-30 (view that
court-martial jurisdiction was limited to those offenses having direct impact on military
discipline), 2930 n.10 (view that language encompassed all noncapital crimes proscribed by the law).
57. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2931. O'Callahanwas said to be backed by a "dearth
of historical support". Id.
58. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2931-32. See Cooper, O'CallahanRevisited: Severing
the Service Connection, 76 MIL. L. REv. 165, 167-85 (1977).
59. Solorio, 107 S.Ct. at 2932. See generally Caudell-Feagen & Warshawsky,
Service-Connection and Drug-Related Offenses: The Military Courts' Ever-Expanding
Jurisdiction, 54 GEO. WASH L. REV. 118, 130-42 (1985) (examination of military
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
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found this to be a valid reason for a return to the traditional status test.
It is possible, however, that much of the confused interpretation flows
from the reluctance of military courts to release jurisdiction even in cases involving an attenuated military interest. 60 Nevertheless, the Court felt that the
combination of scattered decisions and O'Callahan'sdoubtful foundation led
to a reading of "clause 14 in accord with the meaning of its language as [given
by the Court] in the many years before O'Callahan was decided."6 1
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment.6 2 Stevens felt that prudential
considerations were adequate to prevent the Court from overruling
O'Callahan.63 "The fact that any five members of the Court have the power to
reconsider settled precedents at random does not make that practice legitimate." 64 Justice Stevens believed the Court could easily have found the offenses "service-connected" under the Relford factors and bypassed this Con65
stitutional realignment.
The dissent in Solorlo, written by Justice Marshall, points out that the
O'Callahandecision was not based upon an interpretation of article I, section
8, clause 14 but rather upon whether Congress had encroached upon the rights
of servicemen when they exercised their power over cases not arising in the
military.66 O'Callahanaccepted that cases held in military courts do not require the 5th and 6th amendment protections.67 To Marshall, and the
O'Callahancourt, the pivotal question was whether the case arose in the land
or naval forces, as recited by the fifth amendment, and consequently used to
deny the grand jury indictment requirement and inferentially trial by jury in
court-martial proceedings.6 8 If a case did not "arise 'in the land or naval
court's view that drug offenses are always of such a nature to directly affect military
performance).
60. Cooper, supra note 58, at 186. See also Sherman, supra note 8; Caudell-

Feagen & Warshawsky, supra note 59, at 142.

61. Solorio, 107 S.Ct. at 2933.
62. Id.
63. Cf. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) ("The power of

courts, and ultimately of [the Supreme Court], to pass upon the constitutionality of
acts of Congress arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of this judicial authority for their protection against actual interference."); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 552 (1947) ("[C]onstitutional issues affecting legislation
will not be determined ... in advance of the necessity of deciding them. .. " ).
64. 107 S.Ct. at 2933 (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. Id.
66. Solorlo, 107 S.Ct. at 2934 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 261. See Van Loan III, The Jury, the Court-Martial, and the Constitution, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 366 (1972). But see Henderson,
Courts-Martialand the Constitution"The OriginalUnderstanding,71 HARV. L. REV.
293, 303-15 (1957) (reading the Constitution to include Bill of Rights protections in
court-martial proceedings); Remcho, Military Juries: ConstitutionalAnalysis and the
Need for Reform, 47 IND. LEGAL F. 193, 207-18 (1972) (challenging the military court
exclusion from Bill of Rights guarantees).
68. Whelchel v. MacDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950); Ex parte Quirin, 317

U.S. 1, 40 (1942); O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 261; Caudell-Feagen & Warshawsky,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/7
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forces'" then the Bill of Rights safeguards must be enforced. 9
It was by interpreting this "arise in the land or naval forces" language
that the O'Callahancourt sought to establish the "service-connected" test.1 °
This explains why "suspicion" of military courts was more important to the
Court than a determination of the actual practice which was applied or which
had been applied previously in American history. 1 The majority in Solorlo
ignores what limitations the Bill of Rights might impose on the reach of article
I, section 8, clause 14.72 Thus the view held in O'Callahan that Congress'
general powers are to be "exercised in harmony with express guarantees of the
Bill of Rights"7 3 was discounted.
An interesting portion of the opinion in O'Callahanwas a quote from an
earlier decision in Toth v. Quarles74 which stated the "constitutional power of
Congress to authorize trial by court-martial must be limited to 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' 175 This suggested that any infringement upon the serviceman's constitutional rights would necessarily be limited
to the smallest amount required to achieve the military courts' goal of maintaining discipline. The Solorio court passed over this point quickly in an early
footnote, by distinguishing Toth on the grounds that it addressed only courtmartial jurisdiction over ex-servicemen who had committed unlawful acts
while still active members of the armed forces. 1 In Toth, the Court reached
its result after an assessment of whether discipline in the military would be
enhanced by allowing military jurisdiction over the accused.71 The Court reasoned that the value of maintaining the right to jury trial and the great historical significance found therein requires that any apparent limitation upon the
right be examined closely7 8 It is probable that the Court in Toth intended this
principle to apply beyond simply an "ex-serviceman" factual setting.
Further what the majority perceived as an inability on the part of civilian
supra note 59, at 121-22.
69. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2933 (Marshall, J., dissenting); O'Callahan,395 U.S.
at 262 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Comment, O'Callahanand Its Progeny: A
Survey of Their Impact on the Jurisdictionof Courts-Martial,15 VILL. L. REv. 712,
719-21 (1970) (no need to harmonize congressional powers because of legitimate interest in regulating soldier's relationship with civilian community).
70. O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 272-73. "[T]he crime to be under military jurisdiction must be service-connected, lest 'cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger,' as used in the Fifth
Amendment, be expanded to deprive every member of the armed services of the benefits of an indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a jury of his peers." Id.
71. See generally Kaczynski, supra note 41, at 241-42.
72. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2934.
73. O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 273.
74. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
75. O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 265 (quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22-23
(1955)).
76. O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 265.
77. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955).
78. Id. at 23 n.22; Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1935).
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and military courts to apply the service-connection test is evidenced in the9
almost immediate expansion of the O'Callahan doctrine after the decision.7
The majority claimed that the confusion was not reduced by the 1971 decision
in Relford, which attempted to clarify the test.80
Justice Marshall, however, contended that Solorio is an example that the
test is workable even though it may require a careful analysis of the specific
facts. 1 The complete and well reasoned application of the Relford factors ex82
hibited by the military judge in Solorio was ignored by the Supreme Court.
That military courts have ignored the "service-connection" test and refused to take the time and consideration necessary to give a fair assessment of
the accused's constitutional rights83 is no reason to allow those courts to escape
the test and infringe upon these rights. If the Bill of Rights is to be honored,
84
then inconvience and judicial time saving should not justify its dismissal.
The return to the military status test is a sad note in our nation's history.
It appears that in this arena the United States has failed to keep pace with the
democratic procedures developed by some of our European counterparts. 5 If
79. United States v. Keaton, 19 C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969) (recognition of
an exception for service personnel stationed overseas); United States v. Paxiao, 18
C.M.A. 608, 40 C.M.R. 320 (1969) (exception for offenses committed on-post even
where civilian persons and property involved); United States v. Beeker, 18 C.M.A. 563,
40 C.M.R. 275 (1969) (drug offenses deemed as imposing an inherent threat to the
military community); United States v. Rego, 19 C.M.A. 9, 41 C.M.R. 9 (1969)
(housebreaking and larceny in the civilian community where victim was a fellow serviceman); United States v. Morisseau, 19 C.M.A. 17, 41 C.M.R. 17 (1969) (check
forgery off-post facilitated by military status). See generally Cooper, supra note 58;
Birnbaum & Fowler, Military Appellate Decisions FollowingO'Callahan v. Parker, 38
FORDHAM L. REV. 673, 673-86 (1970).
80. See Caudell-Feagen & Warshawsky, supra note 59, at 127-30.
81. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2941.
82. Id.
83. Caudell-Feagen & Warshawsky, supra note 59, at 140. Cf. United States v.
Alef, 3 M.J. 414, 416 n.4 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26, 28
n.1 (C.M.A. 1976).
84. The Supreme Court has declared:
The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections
against arbitrary government actions are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine
and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution
and undermine the basis of our Government.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (plurality opinion).
85. Sherman, supra note 8, at 566. The O'Callahandecision had merely brought
the United States in line with West Germany, Sweden, Austria and Denmark, who
provide civilian trial for all offenses, and the United Kingdom which provides civilian
trial for offenses against the person or property of a civilian. Id.
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this is so, we have been set back in our attempt to develop a fair military
justice system. 8
DEAN L. COOPER

86. S.F. Ansell, acting Judge Advocate General from 1917 to 1919, called for
the following change in the military justice system:
With the utmost care it should guarantee those safeguards and that protection for an accused whose life and liberty are placed in jeopardy, which are
the pride of our enlightened civilization. None of these things does our code
do, and none of these things can it do, until it changes its base from the
ancient English theory and comes to conform to American principles of
government.
Ansel, supra note 46, at 3.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 7

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/7

12

